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Security and Resiliency Analytics for Smart Grids

Static and Dynamic Approaches

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Static and Dynamic Approaches

 Springer

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*The whole of science is nothing more than a
refinement of everyday thinking.*

— Albert Einstein

Preface

Driven by the rapid advancement of technology and the growing need of business requirements, cyber communications are embedded in many physical systems. The integration of cyber and physical capabilities leads to the creation of many applications with enormous societal impact and economic benefit. The emerging systems that connect the cyber-world of computing and communications with the physical world are cyber-physical systems (CPS). Operations are monitored, analyzed, and controlled in CPS using cyber systems that interconnect physical components. Many CPS are defined as critical infrastructures due to their national importance. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Critical infrastructures are the assets, systems, or networks, whose incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety”. Any damage or unavailability of such a critical infrastructure often has a massive and broader impact.

This book targets a state-of-the-art important concern of protecting critical infrastructures like smart grids. The work presents various static and dynamic security analysis techniques that can automatically verify smart grid security and resiliency and provably identify potential attacks in a proactive manner. These techniques serve three major security and resiliency analysis objectives. The first objective is to formally verify the compliance of smart grid configurations with the security and resiliency guidelines. More specifically, a formal framework is presented that verifies the compliance of the advanced metering infrastructure and supervisory control and data acquisition system with the security and resiliency requirements, and generates remediation plans for potential security violations. The second objective is the formal verification of the security and resiliency of smart grid control systems. In this respect, a formal model is presented that analyzes attack evasions on state estimation, a core control module of the supervisory control system in smart grids. The model identifies attack vectors that can compromise state estimation. This part also includes risk mitigation techniques that formally synthesize proactive security plans that make such attacks infeasible. The last effort discusses the dynamic security analysis for smart grid. It is shown that AMI behavior can be modeled using event logs collected at smart collectors, which in turn can be

verified using the specification invariants generated from the configurations of the AMI devices.

Although the focus of this book is the smart grid security and resiliency, the presented formal analytics are generic enough to be extended for other cyber-physical systems, especially which are involved with industrial control systems (ICS). Therefore, industry professionals and academic researchers will find this book as an exceptional resource to learn theoretical and practical aspects of applying formal methods for the protection of critical infrastructures.

Unlike the existing books on the smart grid security that mostly discuss various security issues and corresponding challenges, this book offers unique solutions addressing these challenges. The book covers novel techniques which can automatically, provably, and efficiently analyze the security and resiliency of the smart grids. The distinct features included in this book are formal modeling of smart grid configurations, proactive and noninvasive verification of smart grid security and resiliency properties, identification of potential threats, and corresponding mitigations. This book includes various illustrative case studies and extensive evaluation results demonstrating the efficacy of the formal techniques. We expect this book will maximize reader insights into theoretical and practical aspects of applying formal methods for the protection of critical infrastructures.

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